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Abstract 
 Negotiations are an important part of the society we live in. We engage in 
negotiations more often than one might realise and it can be seen as a fundamental tool in 
reaching many goals in life. Some negotiators are definitely better than others and many 
different studies have shown the tendency of men to reach better negotiation outcomes 
than women. Among the various explanations discussed in available literature, the 
current study looked into the interaction between gender and power in creating and 
claiming value. More specifically, we aimed to investigate if men and woman would 
differentiate in negotiation outcomes when placed under different power constellations 
where power was asymmetric or equal. We introduced a new paradigm, where 
participants were able increase the value of potential deals by including four optional 
issues to the negotiation table in addition to two mandatory issues. Fifty-one mixed 
gender dyads based in the Netherlands participated in a negotiation role-play, where their 
ultimate goal was to reach the highest amount of points as an individual. The outcome of 
this study indicated that gender was not a predictor of value creation whereas men and 
women performed similarly in terms of value claiming in the game as a whole of the 
game but differences were observed when looking from a mandatory/optional issues 
angle. Men and women performed similarly in the mandatory session, but men were 
more likely to outperform women in the optional session.  
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License to Claim: The Influence of Power Asymmetry on Men and Women’s Value 
Claiming Potential 
Negotiations are part of our daily activities. Whether we try to reach an agreement on 
a holiday destination with family members or a salary raise with a current employer, the 
act of negotiation can be viewed as an important strategy in achieving various goals in 
our current society. Even though negotiation has been the topic of extensive discussion 
due to its dynamic and complex nature, individual differences are still an interesting 
angle in predicting people’s effectiveness to reach the best possible outcome. Gender 
differences for instance, have been outlined as one of the most on-going issues in 
negotiation research (Kray & Thompson, 2005). In a society where we often observe pay 
gaps between men and women, negotiation skills are especially important in addressing 
the issue and understanding why some negotiators reach better outcomes than others.  For 
example, it has been observed that men reach better economical results than women do, 
as women were less likely to initiate a negotiation and negotiate less competitively than 
men. However, explaining these differences solely based on gender membership might 
not provide the complete picture as other factors might influence these observations. To 
better comprehend why men and women differentiate in the negotiation table, multiple 
theories and underlying mechanisms have been proposed (Kray & Thompson, 2005). 
Central to the current discussion is the interaction between power asymmetry and gender 
in expanding the pie, where a new way to increase value is proposed.  
 Imagine yourself entering a negotiation knowing your counterpart is the head of a 
large multinational organization. Would that affect the way you plan to negotiate or could 
that have an influence on the outcomes for both parties? Answering this first set of 
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questions requires rethinking how we perceive negotiating as a function of the 
environment, the situation and the negotiators at play. Contrary to the neoclassical 
economic approach that assumes all humans tend to make rational choices to maximize 
gains (Weintraub, 1993), aspects of the situation might trigger reactions that influence 
our decision making process to claim the value created during a negotiation. Some of the 
aspects that can be considered in such a situation is, for instance, your own standpoint: do 
you consider yourself to be in the same power position as your counterpart? And would 
the perception of power asymmetry between the two of you impact how much you 
believe to be entitled from the value created in the negotiation? And if we turn things 
around, would you feel more entitled if you were actually the head of a well-known 
company? These are provocative questions that will play a great role in the coming 
discussion and one we have incorporated with a gender aspect.  
 Similarly to gender differences in negotiation, power has also been the target of 
many discussions in the scientific community. Among the extensive literature on the 
interaction between power and gender, Hong and Wijst (2013) revealed that power 
differences during a negotiation tend to impact men and women in completely distinct 
ways. While men’s behaviour during a negotiation was not affected by being in a more 
powerful position, women showed an increased tendency to make first offers and to reach 
better negotiation outcomes than did women who considered themselves to have less 
power than its counterpart. These findings suggest that power has an important effect on 
women’s performance, providing a possible explanation for the frequently observed 
gender differences in negotiation.  
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Expanding the pie before dividing it 
 One might question at this point what exactly can be considered a better outcome in 
a negotiation? Two important factors of comparison that can be use when two or more 
parties are trying to reach a mutually acceptable agreement are value creation and value 
claiming. The pie analogy is often used to describe what these two factors mean. In 
enlarging the pie (value creation one seeks to increase the amount of beneficial goods to 
be divided, in slicing the pie (value claiming) negotiators seek to gain a larger part of the 
existing worth. What is usually observed in terms of behavior in scientific literature is a 
tendency to link value creation to cooperation and value claiming to competition (Lax & 
Sebenius 1986). This means that to leverage mutual worth and reach an agreement 
beneficial for both parties, some level of cooperation and competition is necessary (Miles 
& LaSalle, 2009). They argue that by using cooperation, negotiators are able to find 
mutually beneficial solutions and by using competition, they can promote individual 
interests. Miles and LaSalle (2008) further suggest that the two strategies are actually 
intertwined and negotiators that can make use of both cooperation and competition 
should have a key advantage. This line of reason actually makes sense we think about the 
outcomes of the possible strategies combined, it can be considered a sort of negotiators 
dilemma. When we have a cooperating party against a competing counterpart, it is 
possible that one side will claim more value leaving one side worse off than the other. 
When both use competition there might be a strong tension between parties and little 
mutual benefit, and when both cooperate parties might not explore the full range of 
possibilities. When to cooperate and when to compete in order to slice the pie is an 
interesting aspect and we seek to understand if there are any gender differences in value 
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claiming in cross gender negotiating dyads. On a gender level, past research has outlined 
that women are less likely to effectively use both cooperation and competition in dividing 
the pie, as women tend to focus in the relationship aspect of the negotiation whereas men 
are more concerned with individual outcomes (Calhoun & Smith, 1999). Thus, a possible 
interpretation can be given here where the focus on individual outcomes offers men the 
advantage of making use of competition and cooperation while women’s relationship 
focus poses a conflict to integrate a competitive approach.  
The gender orientation dividing the pie 
 In the present study, we investigated the influence of power asymmetry on men and 
women’s negotiating outcomes. More specifically, I examined if power was able to 
leverage the existing gender differences in value claiming potential often observed 
between men and women. Central to these predictions is the often observed differences in 
performance between men and women in terms of negotiation (Kray & Thompson, 
2005).  According to gender theorists, social constraints resulting from unmet expected 
gender stereotype behavior is an important contributor to these frequently observed 
performance variances (Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider & Amanatullah, 2009). The female 
stereotype that entails characteristics such as communality, caring, and helpfulness are 
generally not seen in line with effective negotiation, who are generally correlated with 
typical masculine traits such as independence and assertiveness. Because gender 
stereotypes can act as social norms, they also guide behavior on how people ought to be 
or do. Violating these expectations may result in backlash where evaluators make 
negative judgments about women acting different from what their gender roles predict. In 
an attempt to avoid these negative consequences, women might face a dilemma in 
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assuming leadership roles, inhibiting them from exercising the necessary assertiveness 
necessary to achieve better career and negotiation outcomes.  
 Based on the assumption that women are more likely to act more giving and 
altruistic (Rand, Everett, Capraro & Barcelo, 2016), I suggested that once placed in a 
situation of low control of resources, women might fail to engage in strategies that claim 
the potential worth available. The rationale behind it is that using a cooperative strategy 
against a counterpart that is more likely compete can be argued to be non-beneficial as it 
does not foster an environment of commitment in finding mutually beneficial outcomes. 
On the contrary, a competitive approach may help individuals’ to accumulate value by 
manipulating cooperative individuals and protecting oneself against exploitation by other 
competitive individuals (Halevy & Phillips, 2014). Empowered women on the other hand 
might able to override their gender role expectations and engage in more competitive 
behaviour that leads to higher value claiming than low power females.  
 To investigate the mentioned expectations, participants in the Netherlands took part 
in a role-play negotiation aimed at shedding some light into gender differences in 
negotiation outcomes and the potential influence of power in individual cross-gender 
value claiming outcomes. The current study focuses on a novel paradigm, where the 
approach is on offering the possibility to expand the pie by adding issues that were 
explicitly non-mandatory.  
The usual approaches 
Past research into multi-issue negotiation methodologies has often focused on the use 
of distributive and integrative approaches. A classic example of how distributive and 
integrative interests fit together are described by the story of two sisters who disputed one 
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single orange (Fisher & Ury, 1981). To resolve the dispute they decide to cut the orange 
in the middle, leaving one half to each of them. They later found out one of them was 
only interested in the juice, while the other wanted the orange peel. In distributive 
negotiations, there is only one issue negotiated at a time and an increase in profit in one 
side of the negotiation table means a decrease or loss on the other side (Mazei et al., 
2015). It is considered the classical view of a negotiation, based on a win-lose approach 
that derives from using competitive strategies to obtain the largest benefit piece of the 
orange. It does not include the possibility of enlarging the pie, as negotiators are 
generally more concerned about their own outcomes than the joint outcomes of all 
negotiating parties (Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 2009). In distributive negotiations, 
making aggressive first offers is a common tactic used to maximize outcomes and is 
regarded as a highly assertive behaviour (and possibly masculine) that is broadly 
considered not in line with the female gender role. On the other hand, integrative 
negotiations is considered a way to find alternative solutions that benefit all parties by 
integrating interests and increasing added value for each negotiator (Tajima & Fraser, 
2001). It requires a high concern for one self and for the others as it provides an 
opportunity to benefit both parties through the discussion of multiple issues (Mazei et al., 
2015). It involves proactive cooperative behaviour such as asking questions and finding 
out the interests of others and it is often viewed as congruent with the female role. It also 
demands that negotiators keep the balance between ‘giving and taking’ without losing 
track of one’s goals and priorities. However, it is still a method that focuses on the 
exchange of “favours”, by gaining on some important issues and losing on some other 
less important issues (often called logrolling) (Tajima & Fraser, 2001) it is believed to 
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generate alternatives that improves one’s outcome without hurting the other party, by 
giving up authority in unimportant issues whilst gaining authority over issues that are 
more imperative. Most scientific research point out to the benefits of each approach but 
what about completing these two approaches into one single negotiation game? The 
current study aims to investigate gender differences in claiming value under certain 
negotiation dynamics. The reason for this specific focus lies on the idea that value 
creation is something that both negotiators do together while in value claiming 
negotiators compete against each other to maximize individual gains. Therefore, we 
expected stronger effects of power and gender on value claiming rather than value 
creation. However, value creation had an essential role to this study, as it was an 
important contributor to our new paradigm where “expanding the pie” is essential but has 
been largely ignored by traditional earlier studies who focused mostly on “solve all 
issues” type of role-play. Therefore, our hypotheses were focused on value claiming but 
value creation will still be reflected in this paper was a background research question. 
A new paradigm: combining integration and distribution 
In this study, we suggest a new approach that takes into consideration both 
negotiation strategies: expanding the pie by including (integrative and distributive) issues 
which are not strictly necessary to reach a deal, but increase the value of the deal when 
included. The so-called mandatory-optional issue paradigm involves promoting value 
creation by allowing the addition of solutions that benefit one party without hurting the 
other (König, 2017). That means that, counterparts are able to enlarge the pie without the 
need to settle for a simple compromise by including issues in the negotiation that are by 
nature optional. In other words, these ‘new issues’ are not the primary reason why 
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counterparts entered the negotiation but it has the potential to increase value for all the 
parties involved if incorporated in the discussion. Imagine the following scenario: two 
individuals called Robin and Pat work in a student café and need to make certain joint 
decisions to ensure the smoothly operations of the business. Pat is the general manager of 
the café, while Robin works as a Licenses and Permits manager. When discussing which 
day of the week the café should be cleaned, Robin prefers to close on Sundays while Pat 
has strong preferences to close for cleaning on Mondays. They extensively discuss the 
issue but do not seem to find common ground. They are aware they need to make a 
decision but as they can’t agree on a specific day yet they decide to leave aside for a 
moment and discus other aspects of the business. During the conversation, it crossed 
Robins mind it would be extremely beneficial for the business’ reputation to offer only 
Fairtrade and organic products. Apart for being great for the reputation of the café it can 
also be considered valuable to society and the ecosystem. He knows that Pat has a bigger 
decision power as the general manager of the café but he might have a higher chance to 
convince her if he makes a concession about the cleaning day. Pat on the other hand, does 
not necessarily have any interest on promoting a fair trade concept but he/she also knows 
that would be beneficial for the face of the business. Pat then accepts Robin’s suggestion 
knowing it will eventually create less resistance from Robin to close the café on Mondays 
and won’t necessarily create any negative impact on the business or herself. They both 
leave the negotiation satisfied with the outcomes and certain they can continue to 
collaborate in future negotiations.  
From the example of café above, it can be argued that integrating different interests 
to the negotiation can be beneficial for both parties and that a certain amount of 
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cooperation and competition is necessary. Pat and Robin cooperate in the sense they 
allow both parties to bring different interests to the table but compete on who will claim 
the value attached to each issue. However, most importantly for this study is how cross 
gender dyads perform under power asymmetry in a mandatory-optional paradigm. This 
new approach to negotiations has not been yet investigated by past studies and will be 
described in more detailed in later sessions of this paper as it plays a vital role in later 
discussions. We turn now to the interaction of interest for the current study: power and 
gender in negotiations. 
Who has the power? 
Before moving into a deeper explanation about the influence of power on both men 
and women, it is important to clearly define power within the current study. Hong and 
Wijst (2013) stated that power could be explained as “the capacity of an actor to control 
the resources and outcomes of other individuals and one’s own resources, in order to 
satisfy one’s own or others’ purposes in a situation”. In other words, power can be 
defined as the capacity of an individual to be less dependent on others to reach certain 
outcomes, by for example using its legitimate power of decision to allocate value to one’s 
desired destination. Thus, an individual that perceives to have higher control of resources 
should also feel more powerful than its counterpart. When individual hold certain roles in 
society, they can also be perceived to be more powerful than others. This can be 
explained by the fact that individuals in some positions are considered to have the 
legitimate authority to command others, and their subjects have the obligation to comply 
with (Saito & Ruhanen, 2017).  Therefore, they are less dependent on others to make 
decisions and face less negative consequences for the actions. If you have this type of 
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influence, such as being the boss or the manager of an organization, you are considered to 
have legitimate power.  
But how can power have an influence on people’s behaviour? This process can be 
explained by the Approach and Inhibition Theory of Power, or simply AITP. According 
to Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) power activates the behavioural approach 
system (BAS), motivating individuals to look out for rewards in the environment and to 
behave socially approachable. In a study conducted by Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee 
(2003), it has been observed that individuals primed with high power were more likely to 
act against an annoying stimulus than did individuals primed with low power, especially 
when it was unclear if they were allowed to take action or not. The pro-active behaviour 
triggered by BAS in powerful individuals can therefore explain why they are more likely 
to make first offers and engage in effective strategies to achieve desirable goals. The 
same effect of power has been observed in another study (Galinsky et al., 2007) where 
individuals primed with high power had a higher propensity to negotiate the price of car 
than did people primed with low power. Thus, high power individuals are more likely to 
take action in order to achieve their desired goals than those who believe to be powerless. 
Low power triggers the behavioural inhibition system (BIS), leading individuals to focus 
on self-threatening information and to show more inhibited behaviour. This in turn might 
lead the powerless to feel like they have less control of the situation, resulting in the use 
of ineffective negotiating strategies such as avoiding behaviour and making premature 
concessions. Based on these information, power differences in the negotiation table has 
the potential to influence individuals’ behaviour to achieve self-interest goals.  
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Power and gender 
The impact power perceptions create on value claiming is an important aspect in 
understanding how situational factors affect individual outcomes in a negotiation. French 
and Raven (2001) suggest for example that legitimate power is frequently associated with 
social norms, with bases on cultural values and structures that grant agents the right to 
influence others and others to accept it. Hence, legitimate power has an impact on 
perceptions of how much someone should benefit from the resources available, based 
solely on the belief of entitlement created by one’s power position. Based on this 
standpoint, we aim to investigate if men and women’s respond differently to power in 
terms of negotiation outcomes. Using our example from the café, would Pat be able to 
convince the other party to close for cleaning on Sundays if she was a female manager 
negotiating with a male employee, or all the way around? First, we expected the 
following: 
H1: Powerful women will claim as much value as powerful men 
Taking into account that power might have the ability to influence individuals to act more 
assertively in the negotiation dynamics, it seems reasonable to predict that being a 
position of high power can have positive effects on the amount of value claimed by the 
powerful party. The expectation was that even in the existence of gender differences, 
power would be able to override gender related behaviour for women (cooperation) 
leading powerful women to claim more value for themselves under the distributive and 
integrative potential of our role-play. Under the influence of an activated BAS or the 
belief of control of resources entailed by a high power position (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008), powerful women may be able to think and act more assertively, claiming more 
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value and making less concessions. In contrast, men have shown not to be influenced by 
power so no changes in behaviour were expected by men in power compared to men 
without power. If power can have such an impact, is it possible that low power has 
different effects on men and women? From this line of thought, the following hypothesis 
emerged: 
H2: Powerless women will claim less value than powerless men 
Based on the idea that low power leads individuals to look out for cues in the 
environment to avoid danger (Hong & Wijst, 2013). However, as men still have the 
chance to fall back into gender related behaviour that involves being assertive, we 
expected that little behaviour in men change in relation to men in other spectrum of 
power. In our paradigm, female Pat might claim less value for herself and give in more 
easily to their male counterpart that is not easily influenced by power differences. A 
possible explanation to this behaviour can be accredited to one’s ability to resist to 
yielding and Calhoun and Smith (1999) suggest women have a lower resistance to 
yielding than men due its focus on relationship rather than personal outcomes employing 
cooperation as a main strategy (Calhoun and Smith, 1999). Under a negotiation with a 
distributive and integrative potential, negotiators must be able to juggle between 
cooperation to find new solutions and competition to ensure the other accepts the 
proposal. With a low resistance to yielding, negotiators are more likely to make early 
concessions without exploring the full potential of the value possibilities in the 
negotiation. In our café scenario, Pat might give in more easily to her counterpart that has 
a higher resistance to yielding and is not influenced by power differences. For women in 
low power positions, this tendency must be even more accentuated due the activation of 
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BIC (avoiding threat) and other female gender related behaviour that focuses on altruism. 
A support for this claim could potentially point out to the importance of empowering 
women in low power positions in order to create opportunities for successful negotiating 
skills at all levels of power hierarchy. After considering the two different ends of power, 
a third hypothesis emerged:  
H3: Under conditions of similar power, women will claim less value than men 
At this point, it might still be unclear how we can differentiate negotiation 
outcomes when no power differences exist between counterparts. After all, we have 
created three different conditions: low power, higher power and equal power. That is 
exactly what the mandatory-optional paradigm tries to incorporate and what separates 
this paradigm from all previous existing power asymmetry studies. Power differences 
were actually only existing in the mandatory part of the game, where two different issues 
were discussed and either one person had the power over the two discussing points 
(powerful and counterpart with no decision power was powerless) or each counterpart 
had power over one issue. In the optional part including four different issues, no power 
manipulation existed, allowing the current study to investigate gender differences power 
between counterparts was imbalanced, balanced or not pre-determined.  In other words, 
participants could impose their power on their counterpart on the first two issues but for 
other 4 optional issues no power asymmetry was included. It is possible that when no 
power asymmetry is present, women will rely on information related to the situation, 
leading women would have once again rely on gender related to information that fosters 
expectations of fairness. This thought goes in line with Miller and Ubeda’s (2011) finding 
where they outline women’s higher sensitivity to social cues in determining appropriate 
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decision-making behaviour. In a nutshell, they found that women tend to more often 
make use of egalitarian principles while male are more likely to maximize their 
outcomes. This approach might in turn promote males’ value claiming capabilities over 
female counterparts that focus on the relationship other than the potential value gains 
from the negotiation. The fact that women occupy in larger numbers social roles that 
require self-sacrifice (e. g. motherhood) and other oriented communal behaviour (Rand et 
al., 2016) may cause women to intuitively behave unselfishly in order to fulfil the 
expectations of their gender roles in society. However, the aim of this study was not to 
question if women are by nature more giving or if they are raised to fulfil this expectation 
but we wished to investigate if there were gender differences in value claiming in the 
presence or absence of strong situational power cues. 
Method 
To examine the effect of power and gender on individuals’ negotiation outcomes, 
a role-play negotiation task was designed and conducted. Mixed gender dyads 
participated in a role-play regarding the operations of a café had the possibility to 
negotiate over six different issues. Before starting the negotiation, participants completed 
a questionnaire to assess their understanding of the game and their current identification 
with male or female traits. Thereafter, the game was carried out followed by a final 
survey built to collect further insights on individuals’ personal experiences during the 
role-play. The data collected from the gender identification and the final survey have not 
been included in the current analysis. Once finalized with the negotiation, participants 
were asked to count the amount of points gained during the game. As a last step, prizes 
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were distributed to winners and debriefing was conducted. Please refer to Appendix A for 
a full visualization of the game instructions given to participants. 
A new paradigm 
To incorporate both possibilities of integrative and distributive approaches, the 
mandatory-optional paradigm was created with a broader prospect, as we believe that in 
order to create and claim more value, one must be able to add extra components that are 
optional by nature. Even though it seems similar to mixed-motive negotiations due to the 
combination of distributive, integrative and compatible components, it has not been 
extensively researched. The main difference is reflected in the fact that most studied role-
plays participants have to negotiate all issues in the pay-off schedule whereas under our 
paradigm some issues are optional whereas others are mandatory (König, 2017). It gives 
all involved a chance to participate and increase value for oneself without hurting the 
interests of the parties involved. Increasing the pie under this paradigm has great 
potential, as the value creation is increased and as a result there is more value to be 
claimed by both parties. In practice, six different issues had to be discussed (two 
mandatory and four optional issues). Robin and Pat were presented as the two main 
characters in the discussion, as either the Licenses & Permits manager (high power or 
equal power), Operations manager (equal power) or a regular employee (low power) of 
the café. Therefore, the power manipulation occurred within dyads and not between 
dyads. In the design session of this paper, we further elaborate on the details of this 
approach in practice. 
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Participants 
One hundred and twenty-six participants between the age of 18 and 43 years old 
were randomly assigned to one of the two roles in the game: Pat or Robin. Seven dyads 
that did not meet the understanding questions were excluded from the sample, thus the 
final sample size was comprised of 56 dyads or 112 individuals (M = 21.52, SD = 4.12). 
The negotiators population was comprised of a group of students (from Leiden University 
or Amsterdam College) and a group of working professionals (experienced or interns), 
coming from a variety of different cultural backgrounds. Leone and Lara were the two 
different experimenters conducting the game among the participants’ population, 
collecting data either separately or as a team. Participants were randomly approached in 
three different ways: in student cafés, recruited at Lara’s internship location or via 
Facebook/email. 
Design and manipulation of power 
The current study used a between-subjects factorial design, reflecting the three 
power-gender constellations: high power man negotiating against low power woman (1) 
vs. equal power (2) vs. high power woman against low power man (3). The dependent 
variable (type) ‘payoff outcome’ reflected the amount of points gained by each 
participant at the end of the game. It was used to identify how much value was claimed 
by each gender across the different constellations of power. The game was composed of 
two parts:  a mandatory and an optional session. A man and a woman formed every dyad 
composition in this study and manager roles were distributed among them. Power was 
manipulated by distribution of managing roles. In a asymmetric power condition, one 
players was assigned both manager roles (i.e., had decision power over both mandatory 
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issues), while in the symmetric power condition, each player was assigned one manager 
role (i.e., each player had decision power over one of the mandatory issues). Depending 
on how the two roles of Robin and Pat were randomly given to the male and the female 
negotiator in each dyad, dyads were assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: 
Powerful man against low power woman vs. equal power vs. powerful woman against 
low power man.  In the optional session, four additional issues were included without 
explicit manipulation of power within dyads. Thus, players could jointly decide to 
include or not the issues in the negotiation. The rationale behind it was to give 
participants the opportunity to ‘expand the pie’ by voluntarily adding issues to the table 
that could potentially increase value for both parties. In the Table 1 below, the amount of 
participants for each possible gender/power constellation is displayed: 
Table 1. Gender dyad composition  
Experimental Condition 
Amount 
of Dyads 
Male Robin  
Female Pat 
Female Robin  
Male Pat 
Robin had the decision power over issue A 
and B (Robin powerful) 16 8 8 
Robin had the decision power over issue A 
and Pat over issue B (equal power) 15 9 6 
Pat had the decision power over issue A 
and B (Pat powerful) 18 9 9 
Pat had the decision power about issue A 
and Robin over issue B (equal power) 14 7 7 
 
The distribution of power was explicitly described in the instructions session, 
where the following information was provided on one of the scenarios: 
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“If you cannot agree on a solution for one of the first two problems, the manager will 
decide which solution to take:  
 “Pat manages the Licenses & Permits of the café. If you cannot agree on which 
day you want to close, then you are entitled to decide on a solution for “Day Closed”.  
 Robin manages the café’s Operations. If you cannot agree on how to solve the   
cleaning, then he/she is entitled to decide on a solution for “Cleaning schedule”.” 
Negotiation scenario 
The experiment was conducted in three different locations: at Leiden University’s 
cafeteria, at College Amsterdam and at Lara’s internship. The negotiation role-play 
involved the discussion of six issues regarding the operations of small café popular 
among students and young urban professionals called Bottles and Beans. The first two 
mandatory issues discussed which day the café should be closed (1) and who should 
clean the café (2). The other four issues were optional in the discussion, therefore dyads 
could decide together if they would include it in the overall agreement. The optional 
topics included which type of ingredients to use (1), which type of smoothies to offer (2), 
which type of decorating style to choose (3) and how often to organize themed parties at 
the café (4). Please see appendix B for a full overview of the point’s schedule. For every 
issue to be discussed, there were between three and six agreement options, each linked to 
a certain amount of points as a result. The objective of the game was to reach the highest 
possible amount of points by reaching one common agreement in each issue. The points 
schedule was confidential to each participants and reaching an agreement meant selecting 
a single solution that applied to both parties. For every topic and solution, counterparts 
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had a different amount of points. This means, for each issue one negotiator could for 
example win 6 point for a certain outcome while its counterpart would gain no points.  
Table 2 below provides an overview of how the payoff schedules looked like. There 
were four different scenarios in the game: Pat had the control over issue 1 (1), Pat had the 
control over issue 1 and 2 (2), Robin had the control over issue 1 (3) and Robin had the 
control over issue 1 and 2 (4).  However, the amount of points remained the same across 
the four categories, what differentiated one category from the other was simply the power 
manipulation in the mandatory session.  
Table 2. Point schedule for each dyad 
 Issues Options Points to 
Pat 
Points to 
Robin 
Mandatory 
issues 
Day Closed Monday 
Sunday 
Tuesday 
0 
3 
6 
6 
3 
0 
 Cleaning 
schedule 
Clean after night shift 
Clean before night shift 
Hire somebody 
6 
3 
0 
0 
3 
6 
Optional 
issues 
Themed parties Every week 
Every month 
Twice a year 
No agreement 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
6 
4 
2 
0 
 Ingredients Fairtrade and organic  
Only organic 
ingredients 
Focus on seasonal 
ingredients 
No agreement  
6 
4 
2 
0 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
 Redecorating the Entire café shabby chic 6 0 
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café Shabby chic furniture 
Nordic style furniture 
Entire café Nordic style 
No agreement 
5 
1 
0 
0 
1 
5 
6 
0 
 Smoothies Several types of 
smoothies 
One fresh smoothie 
Refrigerated bottled 
smoothies 
Pasteurized bottled 
smoothies 
No agreement 
6 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
6 
0 
 
As displayed in Table 2, four different issues in the game were distributive by 
nature: the two mandatory issues and two optional issues (redecorating the café and 
which type of smoothies to offer). Also known as ‘fixed pie’ approach, the focus was 
mainly on slicing the pie and getting as much as possible for oneself. That means when 
one counterpart gains points, the other side loses points. On the other hand, the two 
remaining optional issues ‘themed parties’ and ‘ingredients’ can be considered integrative 
due to the fact that as one party gains more, the other does not lose more. Integrative 
negotiation is also called ‘interest based bargaining’ as both parties collaborate to find 
mutually beneficial solutions. Moreover, the four optional issues can be considered 
integrative as adding it to the negotiation can increase the collective gain of both parties.  
Procedure 
The experiment had five different stages as visualized in Figure 1: instruction phase, 
survey to assess if participants truly understood how the game worked and gather 
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information regarding their identification to certain personality traits, negotiation role-
play, final survey to identify the participants’ insights about the game and finally 
debriefing. Both personality traits and post insights information were chosen not be used 
for this study. 
 
Figure 1. The five stages of the experiment 
There were two different procedures depending on how participants were 
approached by experimenters. One part of the participants were randomly approached at 
one of cafés visited by the researchers and the others signed up beforehand via 
Facebook/email. The main difference was in the beginning of the procedure and will be 
detailed in below sessions. 
Randomly approached group. This group were simply approach by chance in 
one of the students cafés visited by experimenters. The only criteria was to find a men 
and women to join the role-play. Once experimenters approached random individuals or 
groups, potential participants were told they the game consisted of negotiation exercise 
where both participants had the chance to win 5 or 50 euros. To ensure that were carry 
over effects of a possible romantic connection between participants, romantic couples 
were not allowed to play against each other. Once this was ensured, the usual experiment 
process was carried out. 
Big group. For participants that signed up beforehand, a specific date was set up 
when the experiment was conducted in one single location chosen by the experimenter. 
Instruc(ons	 Survey	1	 Nego(a(on	 Survey	2	 Debrieﬁng		
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Once everyone had arrived, males and females were asked to find a non-romantic 
counterpart of opposite gender. Thereafter, the game procedure was carried out.  
The procedure. After participants were paired with a counterpart of the opposite 
sex, the experimenter explained how people could win 5 or 50 euros in a lottery. In a 
nutshell, the more points one would gain in the negotiation the higher their chances to 
win 5 euros. This element was specifically included to ensure participants had a sense of 
competition over resources, like in a real life scenario. For a chance to win 50 euros, 
partakers could sign up to a lottery where one prize was draw for every 50 participants. 
The first survey was then handed out, followed by the confidential payoff schedule for 
the six different negotiation issues. There were no specific time constraints, participants 
could take as long as they wished to finalize the discussion and arrive at an agreement. 
Once concluded, payoff schedules were collected to calculate individual points and the 
second survey was handed out. For every individual point gained, one white ball was 
included in a marble bag with 30 of black balls. If individuals randomly picked a white 
ball out of the bag, a 5 euro prize was given to that participant. Thus, both participants 
had the chance to win a 5 euro prize as long as they had at least one white ball (1 point) 
in the marble bag. As a final step, a consent forms was handed out followed by a short 
debriefing session and a sign up option for the 50 euros lottery.  
Dependent measures  
Total outcome per group. As a first step, the points of every single participant in 
the experiment were calculated by adding up the points gained in the mandatory and 
optional sessions. The lowest possible amount of points was -3 and the maximum was 30. 
Among participants of the powerful condition, the lowest amount of points scored was 6 
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and the maximum 25 (N = 34, M = 14.62, SD = 4.77), whereas people with low power 
scored between 3 and 18 points (N = 34, M = 11.71, SD = 4.08). In the equal power 
group, the outcome scores ranged between 7 and 18 (N = 58, M = 13.03, SD =2.91). 
Individual outcome scores were coded by gender, where points for all participants were 
aggregated into a total amount of points for males and a total amount of scores for 
females.  The lowest possible score observed in the female group was 3 and highest was 
21 (N = 63, M = 12.69, SD = 3.85). For males, scored ranged between 6 and 25 (N = 63, 
M = 13.51, SD = 3.98). 
Points on mandatory session. Scores for the sample as a whole was calculated 
for the mandatory issues by adding up the points of all participants on the two 
compulsory issues across the three levels of power. For the powerful group, female 
scores ranged between 3 and 12 (N = 17, M = 8.47, SD = 3.22) and for the males 
between 6 and 12 (N = 17, M = 7.94, SD = 2.59). For the powerless, scores for females 
ranged between 0 and 6 (N = 17, M = 4.96, SD = 2.59) and for males it varied between 0 
and 9 (N = 17, M = 3.53, SD = 3.22). In the equal power condition, the minimum score 
for females was 6 and the highest 9 (N = 29, M = 6.21, SD = 0.77) and for males 
between 3 and 9 (N = 29, M = 5.69, SD = 0.93).  
Points on optional issues by gender. In a similar fashion, scores for females and 
males in the optional session were calculated by the aggregating the non-compulsory 
points of each gender category. The lowest observed amount of points in the powerful 
group for females was 0 and the highest was 12 (N = 17, M = 5.53, SD = 4.03), while for 
males it was between 0 and 13 (N = 17, M = 7.29, SD = 3.95). In the low power group, 
female scores ranged between 0 and 12 (N = 17, M = 6.41, SD = 3.73) and males 
License to Claim: Power, Gender and Dividing the Pie 	
28		
between 0 and 16 (N = 17, M = 9.41, SD = 4.29). In the high power cluster, female 
scores ranged between 0 and 12 (N = 17, M = 5.53, SD = 4.03) and males 0-13 (N = 17, 
M = 7.29, SD = 3.95). In the equal power group, the lowest score was 1 and the highest 
was 12 among females (N = 29, M = 7.03, SD = 2.83) and for males 1-15 (N = 29, M = 
7.14, SD = 3.21). 
Joint outcome. The scores of each gender group was calculated by adding the 
points of the powerful with the powerless participants within each dyad. The lowest 
possible score observed was 12 and highest was 30 (N = 63, M = 26.21, SD = 4.58).  
Manipulation checks 
Perceived power before the negotiation. Prior to starting the negotiation role 
play, participants were asked to indicate how they felt in comparison to their counterpart 
in three different dimensions on a 1-9 scale: weak-strong, powerful-powerless and 
inferior-superior. In combination, the three scales were hypothesized to form an 
underlying scale of perceived power and were coded as numeric variable. To determine if 
the theorized scale was reliable, a Cronbach’s Alpha test was conducted, which showed 
reliable outcomes for both Robin (α = .92) and Pat (α = .94). Thus, there was a 
correlation between the power perceived by participants and both roles included in the 
game. Based on these results, an averaged score was created for Robin (M = 5.48, SD = 
1.86) and Pat (M = 5.48, SD = 1.72). 
Perceived power after the negotiation. To ensure power manipulations had also 
an impact on participants after the game, they were asked to complete a second survey 
containing five questions. The possible answers were a scale from 1-7, ranging from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very much’. Some of the questions stated for example, “In the negotiation, I felt 
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entitled to take decisions” or “During the negotiation, I felt in control”. Please refer to 
appendix C for a complete overview of the survey questions. 
Following the same procedure as before the negotiation, the variable was coded as 
numeric and tested for the reliability of the five questions as an underlying scale of 
perceived power after the negotiation. The Cronbach’s Alpha test showed reliable results, 
indicating the correlation of questions for both roles of Robin (α = .86) and Pat (α = .76). 
An average score was again calculated for each role’s perceived power after the 
negotiation for Robin (M = 5.41, SD = 1.24) and Pat (M = 4.40, SD = 1.16). 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
As mentioned in previous sessions, a series of surveys were conducted to 
investigate the impact our power manipulation had on participants. The first survey 
focused on perceived power prior to the negotiation, Table 3 below shows the means of 
our sample on the three reliable subscales on a scale from 1 to 9. 
Table 3. Means of participants’ ratings of their perceived power after the power manipulation (scale of 1-9) 
 Low power  Equal power  High Power 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
Weak – Strong  3.79 1.67  5.78 1.19  7.47 1.21 
Powerless – Powerful  3.71 1.59  5.74 1.16  7.15 1.89 
Inferior – Superior  3.35 1.51  5.50 1.01  6.58 1.92 
 
To ensure that manipulation of the power through the final decision for the 
mandatory issues had similar effects on participants of both roles and sexes, a 3x2 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance was conducted reflecting the distribution of power (Pat 
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powerful, equal power, Robin powerful) and gender categories (Pat female and Robin 
male vs. Pat male and Robin female). A significant effect of power was found for both 
Pat (F (2, 56) = 18.40, p = .000, η2 = .40) and Robin (F (2, 56) = 59.33, p = .000, η2 = 
.68). This means that when Pat was given the power of decision, she indeed felt more 
powerful (M = 7.44, SD = 1.76) than when in the equal (M=5.35, SD = 1.08) and low 
power (M = 4.00, SD = 2.00) conditions. A post-hoc Tukey-Kramer test revealed that 
there was a significant difference between conditions. Similar results were shown for 
Robin, with a significant effect of power revealed that Robin felt more powerful in the 
high power condition (M = 7.38, SD = 1.17) than in the equal (M = 6.13, SD = 1.07) and 
low power conditions (M = 3.70, SD = 0.79). Once again, a post-hoc Tukey-Kramer test 
showed that the three conditions were significantly different from each other. Thus, we 
can conclude that power was perceived in a similar fashion independent of which role 
participants played before the negotiation. In the Table 4 below the results of the Tukey-
Kramer tests are displayed. 
Table 4. Results Tukey-Kramer test 
 Perceived Power Pat Perceived Power Robin 
 Mdiff SE Sig. Mdiff (95%CI) Mdiff SE Sig. Mdiff (95%CI) 
Low Power 
Equal Power  
-1.44 0.440 0.005 -2.49;-0.38 -2.65 0.325 0.000 -3.44;-1.87 
Equal Power 
High Power  
-1.49 0.415 0.002 -2.49;-0.49 -1.31 0.345 0.001 -2.14;-0.48 
High Power 
Low Power  
2.93 0.483 0.000 1.77;4.09 3.97 0.379 0.000 3.05;4.88 
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Gender and Power 
Below you can find an overview of the total points scored by both men and 
women across three different power constellations. The mean points scored on the 
mandatory issues, the mean points on the optional issues and finally the mean points of 
the total scores.  
Table 5. Overview points gained by gender 
 Women Men 
  M SD M SD 
Total amount 
of points  
High Power  14.00 3.76 15.24 5.65 
Equal Power 13.24 2.75 12.83 3.09 
Low Power 12.94 2.90 10.47 4.76 
Points on 
mandatory 
issues  
High Power  8.47 3.22 7.94 2.59 
Equal Power 6.21 0.77 5.69 0.93 
Low Power 4.06 2.59 3.53 3.22 
Points on 
optional issues  
High Power  5.53 4.03 7.29 3.95 
Equal Power 7.03 2.83 7.14 3.22 
Low power 6.41 3.73 9.41 4.29 
 
  Based on the numbers showed on Table 5, women seem to score higher than men 
across all power constellations in the mandatory issues and on the two ends of power in 
the total amount of points. In the optional issues portion, men scored higher than women 
did on all levels of power. However, it is still unclear if differences are significant and 
that is what we aim to investigating in the next section. 
Testing hypotheses 
Inferential statistics: gender and power. To test the hypotheses within the scope 
of this study, the total amount of points scored by male negotiators and the points by 
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females negotiators was used to perform a 3 (male powerful vs. equal power vs. female 
powerful) x 2 (gender: male vs. female) Repeated Measures ANOVA, where the former 
factor was manipulated between dyads and the latter factor was manipulated as a within-
dyad repeated measurement factor. In other words, the analysis used power by gender 
and total points scored by both genders to test the hypotheses: power overrides the 
situation leading women to claim as much value as men (1), a position of low power 
leads to worst outcomes to women than men (2), in the absence of other power related 
factors, women will rely on information related to gender like behaviour and claim less 
value than men (3).  
After running the analysis, it was found a significant effect of power F(1, 32) = 
5.66, p = .023, η2 = .15) confirming that individuals in high power (M = 14.62, SD = 
3.76) did indeed feel more powerful than those in low power (M = 11.71, SD = 4.08). 
However, no significant interaction between power and gender was found on the 
individual level. As shown on Figure 2, this result indicates that men and women had 
similar scores in the game when power was manipulated. Therefore, we found support for 
hypothesis 1: when given power women claim as much value as men. On the other hand, 
we can reject hypothesis 2: powerless women did not claim less value than powerless 
men, they actually claimed similar amount of points on a statistical level.  
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Figure 2. Mean total amount of points scored on the all issues by men and women across different power 
conditions 
A paired-sample t-test revealed a non-significant difference between the scores of 
men and women in the equal power condition (t (28) = -0.52, p = 0.61). This means that 
men (M = 12.83, SD = 3.09) and women (M = 13.24, SD = 2.75) performed similarly 
when power was equal within dyads. Furthermore, other patterns have emerged from this 
analysis and seem useful in completing the puzzle of gender differences in negotiation 
outcomes. A 3 (male powerful vs. female powerful and equal power) x 2 (gender: male 
vs. female) multivariate analysis of variance was conducted and significant differences 
observed revealed females perform better when in high power than in low power (Mdiff  = 
3.53, p = .018, 95%-CI = 0.52; 6.54) and also better in equal power than low power. No 
significant results were found for males. Therefore, one can conclude that women have 
better outcomes in high and equal power when compared to low power positions. When 
comparing women in different power constellations, the ones in high and equal power 
perform better than females in low power. Men on the other hand seem to perform 
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similarly when comparing all combinations of power possibilities, as none of the 
comparisons were statistically significant.  
Absence of power asymmetry. After investigating our first two hypotheses on 
the total amount of points, further analysis have been conducted to examine if men and 
women had a different amount of points in the mandatory and optional issues. This was 
done to secure we have further information in regarding to how men and women behave 
when given power and if there were any other trends when individuals were not under 
any power manipulations. After all, participants could only have legitimate power over 
others in the mandatory sessions of the game. In the optional part, power was not 
manipulated. For this reason, a 3 (male powerful, female powerful and equal power) x 2 
(gender: male vs. female) x 2 (mandatory vs. optional) Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance was conducted. The power factor was manipulated between dyads, while 
gender was within dyads and the comparison of points in mandatory and optional was 
also done within dyads. 
Firstly, the total amount of points on the mandatory issues of men versus women 
were tested and a significant interaction was found between gender and power by gender 
(F (2, 60) = 5.17, p = .009, η2 = .147). As shown on Figure 3, this result mean that men 
and women indeed differentiated in scores in the mandatory session depending to each 
power condition they belonged to.  
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Figure 3. Points gained in the mandatory session across different power conditions 
In the analysis of total points, no significant differences were observed between 
men and women for points scored if they were in a position of high power or low power. 
This means that men and women performed similarly if they were placed in the same 
power condition. However, when looking into the points gained by both genders into 
mandatory and optional issues, the pictures seems to change and gender differences 
started to emerge. The significant interaction found between the type of issue negotiated, 
gender and power by gender (F (1, 32) = 9.78, p < .001, η2 = .246) had showed that the 
amount of scores a female or male scores and the position of power is moderated by the 
type of issue they are negotiating. Therefore, there was evidence found to the idea that 
men and women perform differently when they are negotiating about the optional and 
mandatory issues and when they belong to different levels of power.   
In order to deep dive into possible differences, a 2 (male powerful vs. female 
powerful) by 2 (individual outcome on mandatory issues of powerful vs. of powerless) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted, excluding the equal power condition.  The 
aim here was to investigate if men and women performed differently when they were in 
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similar power positions. A significant effect of power position (F (2, 60) = 19.38, p < 
.001, η2 = .38) confirms that those in the high power condition had indeed feel more 
powerful than those in the low power condition. However, a non-significant interaction 
was observed between power and power by gender in the mandatory issues domain. In 
other words, there is evidence to the idea that men and women perform similarly when 
placed in the same power condition. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported: men and women 
perform claim similar value when powerful. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 is refuted 
once again: women did not claim less value than men in the powerless condition. A 
similar approach was conducted to investigate if there were any gender differences in 
points scored for participants in the equal power position, but this time using a paired 
samples t-test. The results were not significant (t (28) = -1.722, p = .096), meaning that 
men and women performed also similarly in the equal power condition when discussing 
the mandatory issues.  
In order to continue to explore possible gender differences in negotiation and 
investigate hypothesis 3 that predicted women will claim less value than men when no 
power differences exist, a 2 (male powerful vs. female powerful) by 2 (individual 
outcomes on optional issues: individual outcome of powerful vs. of powerless) Repeated 
Measures ANOVA was conducted using the optional scores of participants and excluding 
the equal power condition. A non-significant effect of power in the optional condition 
was observed, revealing that those in low and high power had similar scores. On the other 
hand, a significant interaction was found between power position and gender (F (1, 32) = 
5.09, p = .031, η2 = .137) showing that men and women had different scores when placed 
in the high or low power conditions. As shown in Figure 4, when women were in power 
License to Claim: Power, Gender and Dividing the Pie 	
37		
in the mandatory issues, they (M = 5.53, SD = 4.03) eventually claimed less value than 
men (M = 9.41, SD = 4.29) in the optional part where power was not manipulated. 
Therefore, we partially found support for hypothesis 3: When power is not manipulated, 
women will claim less value than men. A t-test was applied to check if there were any 
significant differences in scores between men and women in the equal power condition, 
only taking into account the optional issues. A non-significant result (t (28) = .117, p = 
.908) revealed that both men (M = 7.14, SD = 3.22) and women (M = 7.03, SD = 2.83) 
had similar scores in the optional issues when power was equal in the mandatory session. 
 
Figure 4. Points gained in the optional session across different power conditions  
Descriptive statistics: gender, power and expanding the pie 
Table 6 below, shows the amount of optional issues dyads in different levels of power 
have chosen to include in the negotiation. The greatest majority of dyads included four 
issues and only three dyads included no issues.  
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Table 6. Amount of optional issues included in power by gender 
 
Amount of optional issues 
included  
 0 1 2 3 4 
Amount of 
dyads 
Power by 
Gender  
Female in 
Power  
1 0 1 3 12 17 
 Male in Power  2 1 0 1 13 17 
 Equal Power 0 3 4 5 17 29 
Total   3 4 5 9 42 63 
 
Table 7 shows that the highest amount of points in a dyad was observed when females 
were in power, followed by equal power and having males in power as the lowest joint 
outcome.  
 Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the mean joint outcome in different power conditions 
 M SD 
Joint outcome  Female in power  26.94 4.24 
 Male in power 25.71 5.87 
 Equal power 26.07 4.00 
  
 To evaluate if there are significant differences in joint outcomes between these 
three groups and if any interaction between variables, further analysis were conducted. A 
3 (man in power vs. woman in power vs. equal power) x 1 (amount of optional issues 
included) ANOVA was conducted to investigate if the combination of different power 
combinations, gender and type of issues resulted in different scores. A non-significant 
result (F (2, 60) = 0.21, p = .813) revealed that all levels of power included a similar 
amount of issues. Furthermore, a 2 (male powerful vs. female powerful) by 2 (individual 
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outcome of powerful vs. of powerless) Repeated Measures ANOVA showed there were 
no significant differences (F (2, 60) = 0.33, p = .723, η2 = .011) observed in the amount 
of points a dyad would create if there in the different power conditions.  
Discussion 
Taken together, the current study draw a few clear messages from the data 
analysed. The general question of this study was to investigate if power had a different 
influence on men and women’s value claiming performance in a mixed gender 
negotiation. What was observed was that men performed similarly across all gender 
constellations while powerful women did better than powerless women (1) and women in 
the equal power condition did better than females with low power (2). From these 
observations we can conclude that in a mixed gender negotiation, women in low power 
positions perform worse than when power is similar between female and male 
counterparts and also worse than when women have more power than the men. In this 
sense, we find evidence to the idea that placing women in a position of low power is 
more detrimental to female’s value claiming potential than it is to men’s value claiming 
when in low power.  
I hypothesized that powerful women will claim as much value as powerful men 
due to changes in women’s negotiation behaviour triggered by situational cues that result 
in more goal directed strategies and higher value claiming. When considering the total 
amount of points scored by males and females, no evidence was found for any gender 
differences in ‘diving the pie’. Therefore, this outcome is line with our first prediction: 
women and men in high power positions had similar negotiation performance. Both 
genders therefore were observed to generally have more points when in power than when 
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not in power or when power was equal between counterparts. On the other hand, these 
results provide support to refute the hypothesis expecting that powerless women will 
claim less value than powerless men. In fact, powerless women and powerless men had 
no significant differences in how much points they have gained in our negotiation role 
play.  
When approaching the results of the mandatory-optional issue paradigm based 
solely on the amount of points gained in the mandatory part of the game, we also haven’t 
observed any significant patterns in value claiming when men and women were placed in 
the same power condition. These results provided evidence to our first hypothesis that 
predicted women would perform similarly to men when high power is set for females. In 
light of gender differences, we conclude (based on the total amount of points gained and 
the amount of points acquired in the mandatory session) that men and women were both 
able to make use of its legitimate power for its own personal gain. This implies that 
gender differences previously observed (Kray & Thompson, 2005), where women have 
worse outcomes than men can be overcome by the possible effects of feelings of 
legitimate power (at least in a mixed gender negotiation). By this means, women are able 
to rely on information present in the situation to drive behaviour that results in higher 
value claiming. However, when comparing the effects of low power on both men and 
women, we observed similar results. Therefore, we can also conclude that low power 
decreases the potential both men and women in claiming value and both genders are 
affected by situational factors.  
Even though the aim of this study was to investigate gender differences in value 
claiming across different power levels of power, the biggest dissimilarities were observed 
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when power was not manipulated. A significant interaction between power and gender in 
the optional part of the game made clear that women claimed significantly less value than 
men when power was asymmetric but solely when they were the ones in high power in 
the mandatory session of the game. These results provide support to our prediction that 
when no situational cues linked to power are present to guide value claiming behaviour, 
women will rely on gender related strategies that prioritize cooperation and fairness, 
resulting in less value claiming potential (Miller & Ubeda, 2011). In fact, a tendency to 
create a fair situation can be provided as a possible explanation to the female’s tendency 
to achieve lower outcomes than men when having experienced high power in previous 
situations. Even though women were able to make use of its legitimate power when 
clearly communicated, this effect is not carried out to situations where power differences 
are not obviously perceived and stipulated. When faced with a male counterpart that has 
clearly less power than oneself, women will take more slices of the pie when specifically 
mentioned they are entitled to do so but as a consequence will ‘give away’ more slices 
than an equal amount when no rules are specified on how to share the value created. At 
this point, understanding the goals of females and males in a negotiation might be crucial 
to contemplate a possible explanation for gender differences. Perhaps reaching a fair 
agreement and maintaining a harmonious relationship between negotiation counterparts is 
central for females while reaching self-gain is adequate for men. Unless clearly specified, 
both genders might enter a negotiation with different goals in mind and deriving 
satisfaction from achieving those. However, negotiations entail a great amount of 
uncertainty on how much a counterpart is gaining from a certain agreement, leaving 
women more susceptible for exploration in terms of value claiming potential. Therefore, 
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exploring what the mechanisms leading women to claim more value under power 
conditions is crucial and would provide the full picture for gender differences when 
power cues are activated or not. We turn now to some of the limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Even though we were able to explore gender differences in claiming value, the 
present study was not able to pin point exactly which dyad player is the responsible for 
the observed results. A holistic explanation would be able to clarify to what extend the 
women are the ones ensuring a fair situation or if men are the ones claiming a more 
fairness after experiencing low power. Future research that is able to make comparisons 
between same gender and cross gender dyads in value claiming results could clarify 
which gender is actually responsible for value claiming outcomes. Moreover, even if our 
role-play reflected a real life negotiation, we recognize it was still conducted under 
artificial circumstances. We have used point schedules and prizes to approximate the type 
of motivation negotiators experience while trying to reach the best personal outcomes but 
it can still hinder the dynamics of a real life negotiation. Most negotiations will happen 
more than once, therefore counterparts might place a higher weight on the relationship 
aspect of the negotiation to increase the likelihood of future joint value creation. This 
could in turn create a higher focus on distributing the value created more evenly for both 
men and women. Future research that is able to gather real life data would be able to shed 
light into long-term negotiations and its consequences to diving the pie between 
counterparts.  
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Conclusion 
The current study aimed at investigating gender differences in mixed gender 
negotiation between two counterparts. The focus was on understanding if men and 
women would different in value claiming results and if power was able to mitigate 
possible differences. A role play game was conducted to simulate a real life negotiation 
between two counterparts of opposite genders, where the goal was to achieve the highest 
amount of points under in order to increases one’s chances of winning a prize.  
The data analysis revealed that when power was manipulated, men and women 
performed equally well across all power constellations. Women claimed as much value as 
men when both genders were placed in the same power condition. This means that power 
was possibly able to override gender behaviour in terms of value claiming results, 
mitigating the frequently observed gender differences between men and women. 
Therefore, no gender differences were observed in considering the total amount of points 
gained in the game as a whole and when power was manipulated. However, when 
considering the amount of points gained when power was not manipulated, gender 
differences started to emerge. A significant interaction between gender and power 
revealed women claimed less value than men when they had previously experienced 
power in the first part of the game. Therefore, we conclude that the behaviour triggered 
by high power was not carried out to the setting where no power asymmetry was present. 
Future research is required to provided more angles to this analysis, where a comparison 
between mixed gender and same gender negotiation dyads would be able to offer a full 
picture on who causes gender differences in value claiming outcomes, the men or the 
women?   
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Sample of game instructions  
Café Bottles & Beans 
Instructions for ROBIN 
 
THE GAME  
Practice your negotiation skills! This game is about negotiating and deal-making. You 
play Robin. Together with Pat, you work at Café Bottles & Beans. In this small café, 
which is popular among students and young urban professionals alike, you serve coffee, 
drinks and some small snacks.  
In order to ensure a smoothly going business you have a meeting where you discuss six 
problems.  
· Day closed: On which day should the café be closed?  
· Cleaning: Who should clean the café?  
· Themed parties: Should you hold themed parties?  
· Ingredients: Should you use only certified organic or Fairtrade ingredients?  
· Smoothies: Should you sell smoothies?  
· Redecorating the café: Should you redecorate the café?  
 
There are a few possible solutions for each problem, and you have a preference for one 
of the solutions.  
 
OBJECTIVE OF THE GAME  
The objective of the game is to reach an agreement on which solution to choose for a 
problem.  
Reaching an agreement means selecting one solution, which then applies to both 
parties. You must select a solution for the first two issues, otherwise you cannot run the 
café! You may select a solution for the latter four problems, too. Note, however, that this 
is not necessary in order to run the café. If you cannot agree on a solution for one of the 
first two problems, the manager will decide which solution to take:  
Ø You manage the Licenses and Permits of the café. If you cannot agree on which 
day you want to close, then you are entitled to decide on a solution for “Day 
Closed”.  
Ø You also manage the café’s Operations. If you cannot agree on how to solve the 
cleaning, then you are entitled to decide on a solution for “Cleaning schedule”.  
 
Points. With each solution, you can earn or lose a number of points. Take a look at the 
colorful sheet: You prefer the solutions where you earn most points (i.e., the highest 
black numbers). The negative numbers in red indicate an undesirable solution where you 
lose points.  
Your goal is to earn as many points as possible for yourself. The more points you earn, 
the better your chances to win a prize! How do you earn points? By negotiating with your 
colleague!  
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Important note:  
Ø You can mark tentative agreements by crossing a square   in the column (?).  
Ø At the end of the negotiation, mark the definitive agreement by crossing a circle O in 
the column ü!  
Ø You are allowed to talk about everything, but you may not show the point sheet to 
anyone!  
 
Please answer the questions on the reverse side to make sure that all instructions were 
clear 
To make sure that all the instructions were clear, please answer the questions below.  
1. Which solution do you prefer for the problem “Cleaning Schedule”?  
(In other words, for which solutions would you earn most points?)  
□ Hire somebody  
□ Clean after night shift  
□ Clean before day shift  
 
2. What will happen if you cannot agree on a solution for the problem “Day Closed”?  
□ Robin selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
□ Pat selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
 
3. What will happen if you cannot agree on a solution for the problem “Cleaning 
Schedule”?  
□ Robin selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
□ Pat selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
 
4. Who is more powerful in your team?  
□ Robin  
□ Pat  
□ We are equally powerful  
 
5. How do you, in this specific negotiation, feel as Robin, in relation to Pat? 
 
6. Do you need to agree on a solution for the problem “Smoothies”?  
□ Yes, we must select a solution for each problem.  
□ No, this is not necessary in order to run the café.  
 
 
7. Please rate your tendency, in general, to behave... 
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You will get a signal to start. You have 20 minutes to negotiate. Good luck! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
License to Claim: Power, Gender and Dividing the Pie 	
50		
Café Bottles & Beans 
Instructions for PAT 
 
THE GAME  
Practice your negotiation skills! This game is about negotiating and deal-making. You 
play Robin. Together with Pat, you work at Café Bottles & Beans. In this small café, 
which is popular among students and young urban professionals alike, you serve coffee, 
drinks and some small snacks.  
In order to ensure a smoothly going business you have a meeting where you discuss six 
problems.  
· Day closed: On which day should the café be closed?  
· Cleaning: Who should clean the café?  
· Themed parties: Should you hold themed parties?  
· Ingredients: Should you use only certified organic or Fairtrade ingredients?  
· Smoothies: Should you sell smoothies?  
· Redecorating the café: Should you redecorate the café?  
 
There are a few possible solutions for each problem, and you have a preference for one 
of the solutions.  
 
OBJECTIVE OF THE GAME  
The object of the game is to reach an agreement on which solution to choose for a 
problem.  
Reaching an agreement means selecting one solution, which then applies to both 
parties. You must select a solution for the first two issues, otherwise you cannot run the 
café! You may select a solution for the latter four problems, too. Note, however, that this 
is not necessary in order to run the café. If you cannot agree on a solution for one of the 
first two problems, the manager will decide which solution to take:  
Ø You manage the Licenses and Permits of the café. If you cannot agree on which 
day you want to close, then you are entitled to decide on a solution for “Day 
Closed”.  
Ø You also manage the café’s Operations. If you cannot agree on how to solve the 
cleaning, then you are entitled to decide on a solution for “Cleaning schedule”.  
 
Points. With each solution, you can earn or lose a number of points. Take a look at the 
colorful sheet: You prefer the solutions where you earn most points (i.e., the highest 
black numbers). The negative numbers in red indicate an undesirable solution where you 
lose points.  
Your goal is to earn as many points as possible for yourself. The more points you earn, 
the better your chances to win a prize! How do you earn points? By negotiating with your 
colleague!  
Important note:  
Ø You can mark tentative agreements by crossing a square   in the column (?).  
Ø At the end of the negotiation, mark the definitive agreement by crossing a 
circle O in the column ü!  
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Ø You are allowed to talk about everything, but you may not show the point sheet 
to anyone!  
 
Please answer the questions on the reverse side to make sure that all instructions were 
clear.  
To make sure that all the instructions were clear, please answer the questions below.  
 
1. Which solution do you prefer for the problem “Cleaning Schedule”?  
(In other words, for which solutions would you earn most points?)  
□ Hire somebody  
□ Clean after night shift  
□ Clean before day shift  
 
2. What will happen if you cannot agree on a solution for the problem “Day Closed”?  
□ Robin selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
□ Pat selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
 
3. What will happen if you cannot agree on a solution for the problem “Cleaning 
Schedule”?  
□ Robin selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
□ Pat selects a solution, which then applies for both of us.  
 
4. Who is more powerful in your team?  
□ Robin  
□ Pat  
□ We are equally powerful  
 
5. How do you, in this specific negotiation, feel as Robin, in relation to Pat? 
 
6. Do you need to agree on a solution for the problem “Smoothies”?  
□ Yes, we must select a solution for each problem.  
□ No, this is not necessary in order to run the café.  
 
7. Please rate your tendency, in general, to behave... 
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You will get a signal to start. You have 20 minutes to negotiate. Good luck! 
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Appendix B. Samples of pay-off schedules 
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Appendix C. Sample of survey given after the negotiation 
 
 
License to Claim: Power, Gender and Dividing the Pie 	
55		
 
 
License to Claim: Power, Gender and Dividing the Pie 	
56		
 
